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A LEGAL COMMENTARY ON
HOBBESIAN PHILOSOPHY
H. Newcomb Morse*
The objective of this legal commentary is threefold: firstly, to
subject selected salient statements of Hobbesian philosophy to scrutiny
and analysis; secondly, .to delineate the profundity of Hobbes' observa-
tions upon the law; and, thirdly, to reveal the remarkable relevancy,
especially for Americans, of such philosophical utterances today, al-
though made in the England of over three centuries ago.
Hobbes mentioned "a common Power set over them both [two
men], with right and force sufficient to compell performance.":1 This
statement anticipated the Constitution of the United States as a common
power set over all three branches of government (the legislative, execu-
tive and judicial departments, the "irreprehensible," the "irresistible"
and the "irreversible,"'2 respectively), with right (established by the
legislative or executive department or, in the event of questioned legali-
ty, the one or the other with the concurrence of the judicial department)
and force (the executive department) sufficient to compel performance.
Establishment by Mr. Chief Justice John Marshall of the doctrine of
judicial review in the United States made for, not judicial superiority,
but instead judicial hegemony precisely because the Constitution consti-
tuted a common power set over all three of the great departments of
national government. Hobbes referred to "a civill estate, where there is
a Power set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University; J.D., Tulane University; LL.M., Uni-
versity of Wisconsin; Fellow of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences.
1. T. HOBBES, LEVIFHAN 113 (Everyman's Ed. 1950) [hereinafter cited as
HOBBES]. The spelling capitalization and punctuation, including even the variations
therein, of the original manuscript as reprinted in the Everyman's Edition are repro-
duced herein.
2. I. KANT, THE PHImosoPHY OF LAw-AN ExPosrnoN OF THE FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 170 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as KANT].
247
1
Morse: A Legal Commentary on Hobbesian Philosophy
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013
248 TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:247
faith."3  That power, in the context of the Constitution of the United
States, is the executive department.
Hobbes stated:
And they that give to a man the Right of government in
Soveraignty, are understood to give him the right of levy-
ing mony to maintain Souldiers . .. .4
In the American milieu the right of government in sovereignty was not
given but rather was delegated; they that delegated it were the peoples of
the several states, and it (most of it) was delegated not to a man (a king
or prince) but instead to the state governments, and thence a small
portion of that part of it which had been delegated to the state govern-
ments was delegated by the latter, with the concurrence of their constitu-
ent peoples, to the national government under and pursuant to the
Constitution. The most important attribute of this delegated sovereign-
ty (one faction of that portion delegated to the national government) is
"the power to tax,"5 which Marshall aptly characterized as involving
"the power to destroy,"'6 for without this power and the exercise thereof,
the raising and supporting of armies7 and the providing for and main-
taining of a navy" would be impossible of performance.
Hobbes maintained that "there must be some coercive Power, to
compell men equally to the performance of their Covenants, by the
terrour of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the
breach of their Covenant."9 He was alluding to the two-faceted deter-
rence theory of punishment for crime: if the punishment is sufficiently
severe, knowledge thereof in all likelihood will deter A from commit-
ting the crime, but if A nevertheless does commit the crime, knowledge
of the example made of A in all probability will deter B, C, D, and
others from doing likewise. With respect to punishment per se as the
response to crime, it might be noted that this assumption preceded
Hobbes' Leviathan by millennia and was reflected 215 years later in the
title of the Dostoyevsky novel Crime and Punishment, which antedated
by over a century the beginning of an attitudinal change manifested in
the title of the Menninger book The Crime of Punishment, in which Dr.
3. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 37.
4. Id. at 114.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
6. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415, 436 (1819).
7. U.S. CoNr. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
8. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 13.
9. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 119.
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Menninger makes the statement: "[Tihe prevalent punitive attitude of
the public toward criminals in self-destructive, and hence itself a
crime."'10
Hobbes stated:
Again, the Injustice of Manners, is the disposition,
or aptitude to do Injurie; and is Injustice before it pro-
ceed to Act; and without supposing any individual person
injured.
The mere preparation to commit a crime, without an overt act, does not
constitute even an attempt to commit a crime, let alone a completed
crime. Assume, for example, a gang exists consisting of A, a poten-
tial accessory before the fact; B, a potential principal in the second
degree; C, a potential principal in the first degree; and D, a potential
accessory after the fact. A plans a bank robbery whereby B will drive
C to the bank, wait in the automobile while C robs the bank and then B
and C will repair to D's remote cabin where D will harbor them. If, in
arriving at the bank, B and C abandon the scheme, none of them, in-
cluding A, has committed any crime. But while no crime has been
committed, an injustice of manners has occurred; the injustice of man-
ners is, quite simply, Hobbesian for sin. Also, no overt act was neces-
sary to complete the offense of criminal conspiracy at common law.' 2
Hobbes stated:
And so also in Common-wealths, private men may remit
-to one another their debts; but not robberies or other
violences, whereby they are endammaged; because the
detaining of Debt, is an Injury to themselves; but Rob-
bery and Violence, are Injuries to the Persons of the
Common-wealth. 3
A common generic classification of crimes is that of crimes of violence
(or human crimes) and property crimes. Robbery, like arson, partakes
of both characteristics, presenting a classification problem. This prob-
lem was resolved by American courts holding that violence, or the threat
or otherwise putting in fear thereof, is the gravamen of robbery and that,
consequently, robbery is a crime primarily against the person rather than
against property.14  The phrase "robberies or other violences" reveals
10. K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 156 (1969).
11. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 123.
12. United States v. Hirsch, 100 U.S. 33, 34 (1879).
13. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 124.
14. "Larceny is an offense against the possession; robbery, against the person."
Neufield v. United States, 118 F.2d 375, 388 (D.C. Cir. 1941). "Although robbery at
1976]
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that Hobbes preceded the American courts in reaching this conclusion
by over two and a half centuries.
Hobbes stated:
Men look not at the greatnesse of the evill past, but the
greatnesse of the good to follow. Whereby we are for-
bidden to inflict punishment with any other designe,
than for correction of the offender, or direction of
others.1 5
"Direction of others" refers to the second facet of the two-faceted
deterrence theory of punishment heretofore mentioned. Correction lof
the offender refers to the reformation or rehabilitation theory of punish-
ment. While reformation and rehabilitation mean approximately the
same in this context, the former term was used earlier and has more of a
moral ring. Hobbes' thought here has the approbation of latter-day
legal philosophers, as, for example: Roscoe Pound and George White-
cross Paton both use the word "individualization" in advocating that the
punishment fit the criminal rather than the crime. Pound declared:
"Again in criminal law, one of the problems is the individualization of
punishment, the adjusting of our penal system to the criminal rather
than to the abstract crime.'" And Paton said:
Modem criminology considers that the personality of the of-
fender is as important as his act and emphasizes that the
wrongdoer is not only a criminal to be punished but a patient
to be treated. The cry is for individualization of the penalty,
not to let the punishment fit the crime, but the personality
of the criminal. 17
Hobbes stated:
[No man in any Cause ought to be received for Arbi-
trator, to whom greater profit, or honour, or pleasure ap-
parently ariseth out of the viotory of one party, than of
the other: for hee hathtaken (though an unavoydable
bribe, yet) a bribe; and no man can be obliged to trust
him.18
common law is a species of aggravated larceny, the gist of the offense is a crime against
the person, as larceny is an offense against the possession." United States v. Mann, 119
F. Supp. 406, 407 (D.D.C. 1954). "Robbery is an offense against the person." Whit-
ley v. Cunningham, 205 Va. 251, 256, 135 S.E.2d 823, 827 (1964).
15. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 126-27.
16. R. POUND, THE SPIIT OF THE COMMON LAw 49 (1921).
17. G. PATON, A TxT-BooK OF JURISPRUDENCE 349 (1946) [hereinafter cited as
PATON].
18. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 130.
[Vol. 12:247
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Hobbes foreshadowed the modem American prevalence of conflict of
interest and the concern over this nefarious phenomenon. The legitima-
cy of his emphasis of bribery is reflected in that offense being one of
only three national constitutional crimes in the United States. 9
Hobbes stated:
Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that
do ye to them.20
This is, of course, a restatement of the positive wording of the Platonic
Golden Rule, announced three and a half centuries before Christ, and
the Christian Golden Rule.
Hobbes further stated:
Do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have
done to thy selfe .... 21
This statement is consonant with the negative wording of the Con-
fucianist Golden Rule, announced five centuries before Christ. The
distinction is manifested in the moral law today, as interpreted by
clergymen in their sermons, with the accent not on punishment for
committing sins, as formerly, but on reward for not committing sins. It
is the difference between "Be good" and "Do not be bad," the difference
between a mandatory and a prohibitory injunction. Both the clergymen
of a bygone era and the clergymen of the present, in emphasizing punish-
ment and reward, respectively, are consistent in meaning that punish-
ment and reward are dispensed by God. But, according to Hobbes, the
Golden Rule, whether expressed in a positive-mandatory fashion or in a
negative-prohibitory manner, is predicated upon punishment, but pun-
ishment meted out by the state, as enunciated in the following passage:
For the Lawes of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy,
and (in summe) doing to others, as wee would be done to,)
of themselves, without the terrour of some Power, to cause
them to be observed, are contrary to our naturall Passions,
that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like. And
Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no
strength to secure a man at all.22
This calls to mind Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in
Baker v. Carr2 3 in which he wrote: "The [Supreme] Court's authority-
19. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (bribery and treason); art. I, § 6 cl. 1 (breach of
the peace and treason); art. m, § 3, cls. 1, 2 (treason).
20. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 108.
21. Id. at 131.
22. Id. at 139.
23. 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
1976]
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possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-ultimately rests on sus-
tained public confidence in its moral sanction. '2 4 The purse is pos-
sessed by the Congress and the sword by the President, but the Consti-
tution, as the covenant, in Hobbesian verbiage, of "that great [American]
LEVIATHAN, ''2 5 "that Mortal God,"2 that "Artificial Man,"27 this Go-
lem, and the Supreme Court as the interpreter of "the dernier Resort
' 28
of that covenant, ultimately rest their case on sustained public confidence
in their moral sanction.
Hobbes stated:
And as small Familyes did then; so now do Cities and
Kingdomes which are but greater Families (for their
own security) . *.. 29
This is similar to the Hegelian statement: "A nation does not begin by
being a state. The transition from a family, a horde, a clan, a multi-
tude, & C., to political conditions is the realization of the Idea in the
form of that nation."30 The truth of these statements is manifested by the
historical development of the doctrine of self-defense. The word "self"
in the word "self-defense" has evolved in latitude of meaning and has a
meaning quite different in extent from the word "self" in the real
property phrase "self-help." From the standpoint of life, limb, and
liberty, originally, under the common law, man had the legal right to
strike and to kill, if need be, in the protection of only his own person.
Later, however, this right was extended so as to include the protection
by man of the persons of his immediate family. This enlarged meaning
of the word "self" in the phrase "self-defense" is analogous to the
meaning accorded the word "personal" in the law of infancy pertaining
to the infant's liability on quantum valebant for necessaries purchased
which he needed and which were for his personal benefit. The extended
meaning of the word "self" in the phrase "self-defense" was further
enlarged so as to encompass the protection by man of the persons of
fellow human beings threatened with great and immediate bodily harm
unless so threatened in execution of public justice. Or perhaps, regard-
24. Id. at 267.
25. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 143.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 179.
28. Williams v. Watson's Executors, (C.P.S.C. 1759) reprinted in I. SMin, CASES
& MATERIALs ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 453 (1965).
29. HoBBE, supra note 1, at 140.
30. G. HEGEL, HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 218-19 (1969) [hereinafter cited at
HEGEL].
[Vol. 1:2:247
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ing this second extension, the word "family" instead was rendered an
enlarged meaning in this connection so as to refer to all members of the
human family rather than to only one individual family. The present
meaning of the word "self" in the phrase "self-defense" thus bears a
meaning considerably different in degree from the word "self" in the
distraint designation "self-help," which remedy may be exercised, for
example, only by a lessor or someone in privity to him.
Hobbes stated:
The Multitude sufficient to confide in for our Security,
is not determined by any certain number, but by compar-
ison with the Enemy we feare; and is then sufficient,
when the odds of the Enemy is not of so visible and con-
spicuous moment, to determine the event of warre, as to
move him to attempt.31
This statement espouses the deterrence theory in international relations
which probably realized its most eloquent American expression in Presi-
dent George Washington's celebrated statement: "To be prepared for
war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace."32
Hobbes stated:
And be there never so great a Multitude; yet if their
actions be directed according to their particular judge-
ments, and particular appetites, they can expect thereby
no defence, nor protection, neither against a Common
enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For
being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and
application of their strength, they do not help, but hinder
one another; and reduce their strength by mutuall opposi-
.tion to nothing: whereby they are easily . . .subdued
33by a very few that agree together ....
This is a cautionary statement, especially salutary for constitutional
parliamentary governments warring with totalitarian states. The mes-
sage is all too clear: do not debate while Washington, Paris or London is
about to burn.
Hobbes stated:
From this Institution of a Common-wealth are de-
rived all the Rights, and Facultyes of him, or them, on
whom the Soveraigne Power is conferred by the consent
of the People assembled.34
31. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 140.
32. First Annual Address to both Houses of Congress (January 8, 1790).
33. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 140-41.
34. Id. at 145.
1976]
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The objections to this statement in its application to the American
political system are the same objections which were levied against
Hobbes' third aforequoted statement. However, the efficacy of the
latter part of the statement "by the consent of the People assembled" is
borne out by the statement in the Declaration of Independence: "That to
secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed . . ... " Under the
Constitution of the United States, the peoples of the several states, being
sovereign, are both the governed and the governing (through their
elected representatives); there is a hypostatical union of two hypostas-
es; that is, of two substances or natures (governed and governing) in the
person of the people of each state, transposing from the theological to
the political the -following Hobbesian statement: "But the word hypo-
statical union is ...the union of two hypostases, that is, of two
substances or natures (human and divine) in the person of Christ."30
Hobbes stated:
[T]hey that have already Instituted a Common-wealth,
being thereby bound by Covenant, to own the Actions,
and Judgements of one, cannot lawfully make a new
Covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to any
other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission.
And therefore, they that are subjects to a Monarch, can-
not without his leave cast off Monarchy .... 37
This statement certainly is in utter irreconcilable conflict with the Decla-
ration of Independence.
Hobbes stated:
And whereas some men have pretended for their disobe-
dience to their Soveraign, a new Covenant, made, not
with men, but with God; this also is unjust . . ..
This statement surely is at loggerheads with the action taken by Sir
Thomas More, the great recusant, whose "new Covenant" was indeed
truly a "new and everlasting covenant" with the " Immortal God,"80
which Hobbes conceded was higher than the Leviathan or the "Artifi-
ciall Man"40 when he referred to "that Mortal God ...under the
35. Declaration of Independence at clause 2 (1776).
36. IV THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURY 311 (W. Moles-
worth ed. 1962) (1st ed. London 1840).
37. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 145.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 143..
40. Id. at 179.
[Vol. 12:247
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Immortal God ... ."'I Dramatist Robert Bolt, in his play A Man
for All Seasons, has Sir Thomas More speak thusly: "The indictment is
grounded in an Act of Parliament which is directly repugnant to the
Law of God. The King in Parliament cannot bestow the Supremacy of
the Church because it is a Spiritual Supremacy."4  The duty to God
and the duty to the Commonwealth or State are not only different but
unequal and, in the event of the repugnancy of the latter to the former,
the former may be analogized to organic law and the latter to statutory
law, with the following rule governing: "[Tjhe existence and authorita-
tive capacity of governmental instrumentalities for making law, their
powers, and the methods by which their powers may legally be exer-
cised, are subject to the higher law of the constitution. '48
Hobbes stated:
Because the Right of bearing the Person of them all, is
given to him they make Soveraigne, by Covenant onely of
one to another, and not of him to any of them; there can
happen no breach of Covenant on the part of the Sover-
aigne; and consequently none of his Subjects, by any pre-
tence of forfeiture, can be freed from his Subjection.44
This statement could not be used as an argument against the legality of
the secession of 1860 and 1861 because secession was effected by states,
not citizens acting individually, and because the states seceded with the
authorization of their sovereigns, namely, their respective peoples. In
secession, there was no breach of covenant (the Constitution) on
the part of the Southern states as (by and through their peoples)
sovereigns; there were breaches of the covenant on the part of the
national government, but the national government was not a sovereign.
It was not citizens who wished to be freed from the sovereign's sub-
jection, but sovereigns who wished to be freed from the non-sovereign
national government's extra-constitutional subjection.
Hobbes stated:
But by this Institution of a Common-wealth, every par-
ticular man is Author of all the Soveraigne doth; and con-
sequently he that complaineth of injury from his Sover-
eigne, complaineth of that whereof he himselfe is
Author . . ..
41. Id. at 143.
42. R. BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 126 (1962).
43. 1 D. SANDs, STATUTES & STATUTORY CoNsRucrON 13 (4th ed. 1972).
44. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 146.
45. Id. at 148.
1976]
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A man cannot sue himself, nor generally can he sue another when he,
himself, is at fault (the delict doctrine of contributory negligence and
the family relations law doctrine of recrimination); thus, the constitu-
tional law doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Hobbes stated:
[A]nnexed to the Soveraigntie, [is] the whole power of
prescribing the Rules, whereby every man may know,
what Goods he may enjoy, and what Actions he may doe,
without being molested by any of his fellow Subjects
46
This statement bears remarkable similarity to the following statement by
Mr. Justice Bushrod Washington of the United States Supreme Court,
while presiding over the Circuit Court in Corfield v. Coryell:47
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens of the several states? We feel no hesitation in confining
these expressions to those privileges and immunities which
are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to
the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all
times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states
which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming
free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental
principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult
to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended
under the following general heads: Protection by the gov-
ernment; . . . with the right to acquire and possess property
of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety;
subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may
justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.48
The word "Goods" in Hobbes' context has its equivalent in Mr. Justice
Washington's term "property." Hobbes' phrase " what Goods he may
enjoy" has its Washingtonian counterpart in "with the right to acquire
and possess property of every kind." The Hobbesian phrase "what
Actions he may doe" left its imprint on Mr. Justice Washington's phrase
"(with the right ) to pursue and obtain happiness and safety." And
Hobbes' phrase "without being molested by any of his fellow Subjects"
is reflected in Mr. Justice Washington's phrase "protection by the gov-
ermnent."
46. Id. at 149.
47. 6 F. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
48. Id. at 551-52 (emphasis added). This rationale was quoted with approval and
relied upon heavily by Mr. Justice Samuel F. Miller in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U..S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75-76 (1873).
[Vol. 12:247
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Hobbes stated:
For seeing the Soveraign is charged with the End, which
is the Common Peace and Defence; he is understood to
have Power to use such Means, as he shall think most fit
for his discharge. 9
This statement is a progenitor pronouncement of Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall's doctrine of incidental or implied powers, laid down as follows
in M'Culloch v. Maryland5" in 1819: "But there is no phrase in the
instrument [the Constitution] which, like the articles of confederation,
excludes incidental or implied powers."'" That instrument does not
profess to enumerate the means by which the powers it confers may be
executed. '52
Hobbes stated:
For whatsoever, is so tyed, or environed, as it cannot
move, but within a certain space, which space is deter-
mined by the opposition of some externall body, we say it
hath not Liberty to go further. 3
Mr. Justice Miller in the Slaughter-House Cases54 held that a privilege
and immunity55 which owes its "existence to the Federal government, its
national character, its Constitution, or its laws '56 is "that a citizen of the
United States can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any state of
the Union by a bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other
citizens of that state."' 7 How could one establish such residence were
he not allowed to travel to the state of his choice and enter same? The
Supreme Court of the United States, in the 1941 case of Edwards v.
California,53 repulsed a statutory assault by Californi 9 against the
liberty referred to in the Hobbesian statement by "restraining the trans-
portation of persons and property across its border."60
49. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 151.
50. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415 (1819).
51. Id. at 421.
52. Id. at 423.
53. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 177.
54. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75-76 (1873).
55. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
56. 83 U.S. at 79.
57. Id. at 80.
58. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
59. "Every person, firm or corporation or officer or agent thereof that brings or
assists in bringing into the State any indigent person who is not a resident of the State,
knowing him to be an indigent person, is guilty of a misdemeanor." CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 2615 (West) (repealed 1941) quoted in 314 U.S. 160, 171 (1941).
60. 314 U.S. 173.
1976]
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Hobbes made several statements with which Professor W. New-
comb Hohfeld would disagree."1 Hobbes declared: "Right, consisteth
in liberty to do, or to forbeare '62 Hohfeld would say this was a
definition of privilege rather than of right, the closest approximation in
meaning to "privilege," according to Hohfeld, being "liberty."63 Hobbes
wrote: "Right is Liberty";64 in the Hohfeldian schema, "liberty" is the
nearest equivalent to "privilege," and "privilege" is the jural opposite of
"duty,"'6 5 which is the jural correlative of "right."66
Hohfeld borrowed his theory of right and duty as jural correlatives
from Hegelian philosophy; it was written in Hegel's Philosophy of
Right: "In the sphere of abstract right, I have the right and another has
the corresponding duty. ' 67 Hegel also wrote:
The crucial point in both the Kantian and the generally ac-
cepted definition of right. . . is the "restriction which makes
it possible for my freedom or self-will to co-exist with the
self-will of each and all according to a universal law."
[Tihis definition contains only a negative category, restric-
tion.68
-Hohfeld defined right in a restrictive, negative fashion, in this Kantian
tradition, as, for example, in his famous land hypothesis: "[if X has a
right against Y that he shall stay off the former's land, the correlative
(and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off the
place.,' 9
61. See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Rea-
soning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) [hereinafter cited as Hohfeld].
62. HOmES, supra note 1, at 107.
63. Hohfeld, supra note 61, at 41.
64. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 248.
65. Hohfeld, supra note 61, at 30.
66. Id.
67. HEGEL, supra note 29, at 109-10.
68. Id. at 33. See also Tm GREAT LEGAL PmLosoPHERs-ELEr-ED READiNGs IN
JuRIsPRuDENCE 306 (C. Morris ed. 1959).
69. Hohfeld, supra note 61, at 32 (emphasis added). The same land hypothesis,
except more developed and worded differently, is contained in P. VINOGRADOFF, COM-
MON SENSE IN LAw 67 (1913). (Strangely enough, the publication of the Hohfeld work
preceded that of the Vinogradoff work by only one month). This land hypothesis, in
varying verbiage is also found in the following works: T. HOLLAND, THE ELEMENTS
OF JURiSPRUDENCE 83 (13th ed. 1924); J. SALMOND, JUiSPRUDENCE 184 (6th ed. 1920);
H. TAYLOR, Ti ScmENcE OF JURISPRUDENCE 531 (1908); A. KocoUREK, JURAL RE.A-
TIONS 5 (1927); R. POUND, CONTEMPORARY Jnusrc THEORY 74 (1940); PATON, supra
note 17, at 222; J. STONE, LEGAL SYsTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONiNGS 150-51 (1964)
(referring to Austinian legal philosophy); J. AusTIN, Tim PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE
DETERMINED at lxxx (2d ed. 1970) (1st ed. n.p. 1831) (Austin's words, first published
in 1831, are particularly appropriate).
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Julius Stone in his Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings makes
the statement: "The charge that the duties of criminal law and of public
law generally do not obey Hohfeld's specification as to correlatives is,
however, more serious. This was a chronic problem for Austin, too;
and clearly Hohfeld's mind was mainly focused on the relations of
private law."70  Although Hohfeld did not concern himself with crimi-
nal law or public law, this author has demonstrated, in his works The
Hohfeldian Approach to Constitutional Cases and The Hohfeldian Place
of Right in Constitutional Cases7' that the duties of public law (constitu-
tional law) do obey Hohfeld's specification as to their correlatives
(rights) and will demonstrate forthwith that the duties of criminal law
also obey Hohfeld's specification as to their correlatives (rights). Dennis
Lloyd in his The Idea of Law72 makes the statement:
Others, however, such as Kelsen, have pointed out that the
conjunction of right and duty, though common enough, is not
a necessary one, for there may be duties which are imposed
without conferring any rights, as for example in the case of
many public and social-welfare duties. This applies to much
(if not to all) of criminal and administrative law.73
This legal commentary will demonstrate that the conjunction of
right and duty is a necessary, in fact, an indispensable one in criminal
law. Superimposing Hobbes on Hohfeld by restating the central
Hobbesian theme in a restrictive, negative manner in terms of the jural
correlatives of rights and duties within the criminal law milieu, the state
has a right against the subject or citizen that the latter will not be remiss
in abiding by the penal code and the citizen, in accordance therewith,
is under a duty to the state not to commit a breach of the peace. In
return therefor, the citizen has a right against the state that the latter
will not default in affording him security against all persons, both
outside and inside the state's jurisdiction. In conformity therewith,
a duty is incumbent upon the state to the citizen not to fail in extending
security to the citizen against all persons both external and internal.
Stated in terms of the two basic Hohfeldian words and the two funda-
mental Hobbesian words, the state has a right against the citizen that
the latter will not be remiss in obedience74 to the criminal code. The
70. J. STONE, LEGAL SYSrEM AND LAwYERs' REASONINGS 160 (1964).
71. See Morse, The Hohfeldian Approach to Constitutional Cases, 9 AKRoN L.
REv. 1 (1975) and The Hohfeldian Place of Right in Constitutional Cases, 6 CAP. L
REV. 1 (1976).
72. D. LLOYD, THE IDEA OF LAW 311 (1970).
73. Id. at-.
74. See HoBBEs, supra note 1, at 630.
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citizen, in consequence thereof, is under a duty to the state not to default
in obedience of the criminal code, and in return therefor the citizen has
a right against the state that the latter will not fail in rendering to him
protection75 from harm at the hands of any and all persons both with-
out and within the state's jurisdiction. In consequence thereof, a
duty is incumbent upon the state to the citizen not to be remiss in
affording protection to the citizen from hurt at the hands of any and
all persons both external and internal.
Hobbes stated:
[T]he Consent of a Subjeot to Soveraign Power, is con-
tained in these words, I Authorise, or take upon me, all
his actions; in which there is no restriction at all, of his
own former naturall Liberty: For by allowing him to kill
me, I am not bound to kill my selfe when he commands
me. 'Tis one thing to say, Kill me, or my fellow, if you
please; another thing to say, I will kill my selfe, or my
fellow. It follo.weth therefore, that
No man is bound 'by the words themselves, either to
kill himselfe, or any other man; And consequently, that
the Obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the
Command of the Soveraign to execute any dangerous, or
dishonourable Office, dependeth not on the Words of our
Submission; but on the Intention; which is to be under-
stood by the End -thereof. When therefore our refusall
to obey, frustrates the End for which the Soveraignty
was ordained; then -there is no Liberty to refuse: other-
wise there s.7
The efficacy of the foregoing passage was recognized in the following
statement from the opinion and judgment of Michael A. Musmanno
when, in 1948, he was acting as Presiding Judge of United States
Military Tribunal II at Nuremberg in Case No. 9, "The Einsatzgruppen
Case": "The subordinate is bound only to obey the lawful orders of
his superior . . ... 1 Justice Musmanno declared: "The obedience
of a soldier is not the obedience of an automaton."78  (The precise
word in the military context would be "martinet.") Consider Field
Marshal Colonel General Wilhelm Keitel, the example par excellence
of the martinet mentality, who was aptly characterized as "the rigid,
75. Id.
76. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 184.
77. IV U.S. GovT. PRINTING OFFICE, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NuERNmBER MLIrrARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONRMOL COUNcIL LAw No. 10, at 470, 471
(emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as TRIALS].
78. Id. at 470.
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unthinking 'cadet'. ' 79  Justice Musmanno continued: "A soldier is
a reasoning agent. He does not respond, and is not expected to respond,
like a piece of machinery."80 , Fifteen years later, in a law review
article, Justice Musmanno wrote: "[W]hile a soldier's first duty is to
obey, it is also rudimentary common sense that his obedience is not
that of an automaton. A soldier is a reasoning agent. He does not re-
spond, and is not supposed to respond to an order which directs him
to commit murder.""' The Justice continued: "General J. Lawton
Collins, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, excellently put the
matter when he said: 'Discipline in our army cannot be founded upon
a mechanical and uninquiring subservience, but instead must have as its
keynote a respect for the rights and responsibilities of the individual.' "82
General Collins' reference to the word "mechanical" connotes the same
meaning conveyed by Justice Musmanno's use of the word "machinery."
Hobbes continued:
Upon this ground a man that is commanded as a Soldier
to fight against the enemy, though his Soveraign have
Right enough to punish his refusall with death, may
neverthelesse, in many cases refuse, without Injustice; as
when he substituteth a sufficient Souldier in his place; for
in this case he deserteth not the service of the Common-
wealth.83
The right to furnish a substitute in lieu of personally performing military
service existed and remained in American law as late as 1917. During
the War Between the States, in 1863, the United States Congress passed
a statute providing: "[Any person drafted and notified to appear . ..
may, on or before the day fixed for his appearance, furnish an accepta-
ble substitute to take his place in the draft . .. and thereupon such
person so furnishing the substitute. . . shall be discharged from further
liability under that draft. '84  This statute was amended in 186485 and
after the Civil War, in 186786 and 1869,87 but was not repealed until
1917, when the Congress provided: "[No person liable to military
79. Nelles, Book Review, 14 DE PAUL L. REv. 237 (1964).
80. T iALs, supra note 77, at 470.
81. Musmanno, Are Subordinate Officials Penally Responsible for Obeying Superior
Orders Which Direct Commission of Crime?, 67 DimK. L. REv. 221, 225 (1963).
82. id.
83. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 184-85.
84. Ch. LXXV, § 13, 12 Stat. 731, 733 (1863).
85. Ch. XIII, § 5, 13 Stat. 6, 7 (1864).
86. Ch. CII, 14 Stat. 417 (1867).
87. Ch. LVI, 15 Stat. 282 (1869).
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service shall hereafter be permitted or allowed to furnish a substitute for
such service; nor shall any substitute be received, enlisted, or enrolled in
the military service of the United States ....
Hobbes stated:
As for other Lyberties, they depend on the Silence
of the Law. In cases where the Soveraign has prescribed
rule, there the Subject hath the Liberty to do, or forbeare,
according to his own discretion.8 9
This statement is the basis for the legal rule of construction that what is
not prohibited is permitted. The foremost examples of American or-
ganic application of the rule are domestic slavery, secession and judicial
review.
Hobbes stated:
When long Use obtaineth the authority of a Law, it
is not the Length of Time that maketh the Authority, but
the Will of the Soveraign signified by his silence, (for
Silence is sometimes an argument of Consent;) . . .0
Leading illustrations of silence signifying consent in the law are as
follows: Under the doctrine of imposed intention, if an accused stands
mute before the bar of justice at arraignment, refusing to enter a plea of
guilty or not guilty, the law will create a fiction and enter a plea of not
guilty for him. The law is not construing the accused's intention, as his
silence might be interpreted as readily to mean guilt as innocence.
Rather, the law is imposing its own intention to fill the existing lacuna in
order to be consistent with its own preexisting fiction of the rebuttable
presumption of innocence.
The doctrine of imposed intention applies to the law of contracts
whereby, in many instances, silence presumes consent. Silence on the
part of a debtor converts an open account into an account stated. In
regard to a contract for luxuries made during infancy, continued silence
on the part of the infant, even after reaching his majority, effects a
ratification. In regard to a contract of sale on trial or approval, silence
on the part of the bailee past the time specified in the contract, or, if no
time is stipulated, past a reasonable time, will transfer the bailee's status
into that of a buyer. As regards a contract of sale and/or return, silence
on the part of the conditional buyer past the time designated in the con-
88. Ch. 15, § 3, 40 Stat., Pt. I, 76, 78 (1917) (current version at 10 U.S.C. 514
(1975).
89. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 186.
90. Id. at 227.
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tract, or, if no time be provided, past a reasonable time, will operate to
preclude the conditional buyer from reinvesting title in his seller. In
regard to goods patently defective, when there is delivery without an
opportunity of inspection on the part of the buyer, continued silent
retention will result in a waiver of possible objection. Silence on the
part of a defendant in a civil action, who has received proper service of
process, presumes his admission of the truth of the allegations contained
in the plaintiff's petition and will result in the entering of a default
judgment against him. A man's failure to execute a will leaves his
estate chargeable to the law of descent and distribution, presuming that
had he made a will he would have divided his estate in approximately
equal portions among his wife and children.
Hobbes stated:
And Law was brought into the world for nothing else,
but to limit the naturall liberty of particular men, in such
manner, as they might not hurt, but assist one another
91
This statement, liberally construed, proscribes competition as well as
personal injury or property damage through infraction of the penal law
and counsels cooperation.
Hobbes stated:
That the Common Law, hath no Controuler but the Par-
lament .... 92
This statement is the absolute reverse of the famous declaration made by
Sir Edward Coke forty-one years earlier in Doctor Bonham's Case (or
the College of Physicians Case),93 in which he progenerated the doc-
trine of judicial review: "[The common law will controul Acts of
Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when
an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant,
or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it, and
adjudge such Act to be void . . . .,, In England, unlike in the United
States where sovereignty resides in the peoples of the several states,
sovereignty resides in the Parliament. The Hobbesian, Austinian and
American view is that sovereignty is unlimited. But because judicial
review is a fetter on parliamentary sovereignty, Lord Coke's view seems
91. Id. at 228.
92. Id. at 229.
93. 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (1610).
94. Id. at 652.
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to coincide with that of John Locke to the effect that there is a limitation
to sovereignty.
Hobbes stated:
Over . . . mad-men there is no Law, no more than over
brute beasts; nor are they capable of the title of just, or
unjust; because they had never power to make any
covenant, or to understand the consequences thereof
95
This statement is prophetic indeed because it preceded Rex v. Mc-
Naghten96 by almost two centuries and Rex v. Arnold17 by almost three-
quarters of a century. The "wild-beast" form of the knowledge test for
insanity was progenerated in Arnold.
Hobbes stated:
For the will of another, cannot be understood, but by his
own word, or act, or by conjecture taken from his scope
and purpose; which in the person of the Common-wealth,
is to be supposed alwaies consonant to Equity and Rea-
son.
98
Here he lays down the basis for the American rule that there is a
rebuttable presumption of constitutionality cast in favor of all legislative
enactments.
Hobbes stated:
[Bly the craft of an Interpreter, the Law may be made to
beare a sense, contrary to that of the Soveraign; by which
means the Interpreter becomes the Legislator.99
Here he inveighs against what would be termed in the United States
95. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 231.
96. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
97. 16 Howell's St. Tr. 695 (1724). Justice Robert Tracy of the English Court of
Common Pleas stated, at pp. 764, 765:
When a man is guilty of a great offense, it must be very plain and clear, be-
fore a man is allowed such an exemption; therefore it is not every kind of
frantic humour or something unaccountable in a man's actions, that points
him out to be such a madman as is to be exempted from punishment: it must
be a man that is totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth
not know what he is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild
beast, such a one is never the object of punishment ...(Emphasis added). The foregoing passage from Arnold was cited as authority and
paraphrased by Mr. Justice Charles Roe, as the author of the opinion of the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire in 1870 in State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 434 (1870) as follows:
"It has been held within one hundred and fifty years (146 years, to be exact) that the
test in criminal cases is whether the defendant was totally deprived of his understanding
and memory and did not know what he was doing any more than a wild beast."
98. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 232,
99. Id. at 235,
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today as "judicial legislation," as when the Supreme Court of the United
States violates the tripartite division of the national government and
usurps the congressional prerogative.
Hobbes stated:
The Interpretation of the Law of Nature, is the
Sentence of the Judge constituted by the Soveraign
Authority, to heare and determine such controversies, as
depend thereon; and consisteth in the application of the
Law to the present case For in the act of Judicature,
the Judge doth no more but consider, whither the demand
of the party, be consonant to naturall reason, and Equity;
and the Sentence he giveth, is therefore the Interpretation
of the Law of Nature; which Interpretation is Authen-
tique; not because it is his private Sentence; but because
he giveth it by Authority of the Soveraign, whereby it
becomes the Soveraigns Sentence; which is Law for
that time, to the parties pleading.10
The final phrase "Law for that time, to the parties pleading" refers to
the law of the case, as distinguished from the rule of law.
Hobbes stated:
It is also against Law, to say that no Proofe shall be ad-
mitted against a Presumption of Law. 10 '
Of course, in terms of modem law, proof (or evidence) may be admit-
ted against a rebuttable presumption of law but not against a conclu-
sive presumption of law.
Hobbes stated:
There be other things of this nature, wherein mens Judge-
ments have been perverted, by trusting to Precedents
102
This statement is the basis for "the pure stream doctrine" of this au-
thor. Because there has to be some practical basis for judiical deci-
sions, courts have predicted their opinions upon prior holdings, or prece-
dents. This has made for relative uniformity and not inconsiderable
facility. However, this method is of limited effectiveness because a court
tends to base its ruling upon the most recent precedent, rather than upon
the original precedent. As Blaise Pascal pointed out, "Information is so
much more likely to be authentic if you get it at the fountain-
100. Id. at 236-37.
101. Id. at 238.
102. Id. at 239.
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head .... -103 For example, if there were a series of ten cases on a
given point of law over a period of fifty years, the last precedent would
have become diluted, distended and distorted through a process which
might best be described as precedential pollution. The finely etched line
of the original precedent would have been supplanted by the meander
line of the last precedent.
Over a period of time, a number of precedents of a legal proposi-
tion tend to become like silt being carried downstream and forming,
unaided by artificial causes, alluvion. Then to cite the latest precedent
would be akin to citing batture rather than the head of navigation; in
other words, like citing as authority something that has undergone a
primary change of identity, as from part of a riverbed to accessory to a
riparian estate. The courts have been following what could be charac-
terized as the corrosion concept but should follow, instead, what could
be termed the pure stream doctrine by reverting, for the authority upon
which to predicate a decision, directly to the original precedent. This,
then, would afford an effective basis for judicial decisions.
As a legal proposition is enunciated in case after case, each time
the court citing as its authority the most recent case, silt settles upon
the proposition. Enough silt may settle so that the proposition may
attach to the riverbank, with the result that the proposition, even if
relevant as found at its source, has lost its relevancy as found in the
more recent precedents, but only because it has been adorned, embel-
lished and encrusted.
The foregoing thought was expressed well in the following state-
ment by Mr. Justice Campbell Thornal, as the organ of the Supreme
Court of Florida, in the 1957 case of Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa
Beach;10 4
"[l]nstead of disregarding the rule of stare decisis we now merely restore
the original concepts of our jurisprudence to a position of priority
in order to eradicate the deviations that have . .. detracted from the
justice of the initial rule."' 5
Hobbes stated:
For a Fundamental Law in every Common-wealth, is
that, which is being taken away, the Common-wealth
103. THE ESSENTIAL PAScAL 224 (R. Gleason ed. 1966) (Provincial Letter No. 4).
104. 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
105. Id. at 134.
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faileth, and is utterly dissolved; as a building whose
Foundation is destroyed.'06
In the American legal and political fabric, if the doctrines of the federal
(or dual) system of government, the separation of powers between the
national government and the state governments, the absolute coequality
of the several states, the tripartite system of the national government,
and the separation of powers among the three great departments of the
national government were taken away, either wholly or singly, the
Constitution of the United States as -the organic instrument of our coun-
try, the covenant of our "Mortal God,' 07 would fail, and would be
utterly dissolved; as a building whose foundation is destroyed.
If the provision of the Constitution of the United States prescribing
the amendatory process"08 were not complied with, the purported
amendment would not be unconstitutional for the reason that it had not
been integrated into the Constitution and, therefore, had not become an
amendment. However, a proposed amendment which had been effec-
tuated pursuant to the specified amendatory process might be unconsti-
tutional if it contravened, in the words of Mr. Justice Joseph Story in
Terrett v. Taylor'0 9 in 1815, "the spirit. . . of the Constitution of the
United States.""'  The same jurist, in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee"' the
following year, referred to the "spirit of the Constitution." 1 2 In his
concurring opinion in Martin, Mr. Justice William Johnson mentioned
"the spirit, intent, or meaning of the constitution"" 3 and of "the true
spirit of the constitution.""14 Three years later Mr. Chief Justice Mar-
shall in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward"5 alluded to "the
general spirit of the instrument,"" meaning the constitution. The
references by Justices Story, Johnson and Marshall to the spirit of the
Constitution recall to mind the following passage by Immanuel Kant:
The Forms of the State are only the letter (littera) of the
original Constitution in the Civil Union; and they may there-
fore remain so long as they are considered, from ancient and
106. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 247.
107. Id. at 143.
108. U.S. CONST. art. V.
109. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 249 (1815).
110. Id. at 256.
111. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 562 (1816).
112. Id. at 579.
113. Id. at 589.
114. Id. at 594.
115. 17 U.S. (4Wheat.) 463 (1819).
116. Id. at 494.
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long habit (and therefore only subjectively), to be necessary
to the machinery of the political Constitution. But the spirit
of that original Contract (anima pacti originaril) contains
and imposes the obligation on the constituting Power to make
the mode of the Government conformable to its Idea. .... 117
Let us assume that a hypothetical twenty-seventh amendment abol-
ished the doctrines of the limited powers of the United States and the
residual powers of the several states. Such an amendment would be
repugnant to the two articles of amendment which expressly announce
such doctrine"1 8 and to all of the original seven articles and to the other
twenty-four articles of amendment which impliedly do so. Or let us
assume that a future amendment abrogated the doctrine of the tripartite
division of national jurisdiction by abolishing the judiciary as a separate
department and, in the Hegelian manner," 9 incorporating the judiciary
within the executive department. Such an amendment would be con-
trary to the three articles which expressly provide for such doctrine' 20 and
to the other four original articles and to all the preceding twenty-six
articles of amendment which impliedly do so. Either amendment is
incompatible with the manifest spirit of the Constitution. Either
amendment must be considered either as unconstitutional or as embody-
ing a new constitution supplanting the present Constitution of the
United States, circumventing the honest and legitimate method of pro-
mulgating and adopting a new constitution by convention.
Three concepts of real property law which are employed in consti-
tutional law to ascertain whether a body politic possesses sovereignty are
escheat, eminent domain and adverse possession. If property escheats
to a body politic, if that body politic possesses the power of condemna-
tion and if adverse possession cannot be asserted against that body
politic, the body politic probably possesses sovereignty. In reconciling a
conflict between provisions in a deed, resort is had first to the cardinal
rule of contract law: to the intention of the parties. If that test proves
insufficient, then look to the rule of real property law that the former
provision should govern. In reconciling a conflict between stipulations
in a will, if application of the paramount rule of contract law proves
inconclusive, then resort is had to the rule of the law of wills that the
latter stipulation should govern. Since concepts of real property law,
117. KANT, supra note 2, at 210.
118. U.S. CONST. amends. IX, X.
119. "IThe executive power . . . also included the powers of the judiciary . .. .
HEGEL, supra note 30, at 189.
120. U.S. CONsT. arts. I, IIIII.
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and not those of the law of wills, are applied in constitutional law in
determining sovereignty, the rule of construction of real property law
applied in the event of conflicting provisions in a conveyance might be
carried over for application to the Constitution of the United States, in
the event of a conflict between a hypothetical future amendment and the
spirit which permeates the present Constitution.
Hobbes stated:
There is a . . .doctrine, plainly, and directly against the
essence of a common-wealth; and 'tis this, That the Sov-
eraign Power may be divided ....
[A] Kingdome divided in its selfe, . . . can-
not stand. 121
In the American schema of government, the sovereign power, consistent
with Hobbes, is not divided but delegated sovereign power is divided
between the state and national governments and among the three great
departments of each. It is this distinction and the continuous cogni-
zance of it that are of profound signification. When Abraham Lincoln
paraphrased St. Mark122 in saying, "A house divided against itself
cannot stand,"' 23 he intended the term "house" to refer to the United
States. Of Hobbes' "Kingdome" (England) an integral and indivisible
part thereof, the Parliament, as the seat of all sovereignty possesses
unlimited sovereignty but Lincoln's "house" possesses only highly limited
delegated sovereignty, delegated by the several states with the concur-
rence of the peoples thereof, as the source of all sovereignty.
Hobbes continued:
For notwithstanding the insignificant distinction of Tem-
porall, and Ghostly, they are still two Kingdomes, and
every Subject is subject to two Masters. For seeing the
Ghostly Power challengeth the Right to declare what is
Sinne it challengeth by consequence to declare what is
Law, (Sinne being nothing but the transgression of the
Law;) and again, the Civill Power challenging to declare
what is Law, every Subject must obey two Masters, who
both will have their Commands be observed as Law;
which is impossible.' 24
This statement does violence to the great mandatory injunction, as
121. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 280-82.
122. "If a house be divided against itself, that house cannot stand." Mark 3:25.
123. Speech to Republican State Convention, Springfield, Ill. (June 16, 1858).
124. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 282-83.
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expressed in the Holy Gospel According to St. Matthew, of "Render
therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the
things that are God's."'12 5 The Hobbesian distinction is, of course, the
time-honored one between the profane and the sacred, the secular and
the sectarian, the worldly and the canonical. The distinction, however,
is not "insignificant;" it is one of -the utmost moment and gravity. That
"every Subject must obey two Masters, who both will have their Com-
mands be observed as Law" is not "impossible" because obedience is to
two different bodies of law-the mundane law and the ecclesiastical
law-operating in two different orbits, much like the moon and the
earth. When obedience to the temporal law and obedience to the spiritual
law collide, as in the case of King Henry VIII and Sir Thomas More, the
higher heavenly law would supersede the material law.120 The individ-
ual person, granting priority to the eternal law, as the result of gover-
nance by conscience, would have to suffer the consequence imposed by
the transitory law. Actually, the distinction, happily, should not, and
usually does not, constitute a division for, in the words of Sir Frederick
Pollock, "[w]ere the legal formulation of right permanently estranged
from the moral judgment of good citizens, the State would be divided
against itself. '111 7 Thus, only when the distinction is not recognized and
observed is there a division.
Hobbes stated:
[T]he nature of Justice, consisteth in keeping of valid
Covenants: but the Validity of Covenants begins not but
with the Constitution of a Civill Power, sufficient to com-
pell men to keep them .... 128
This same thought was expressed in much the same manner, even to the
use of the noun form of Hobbes' gravamen word in verb form "compel,"
as recently as 1974 by Macklin Fleming in his The Price of Perfect
Justice129 as follows: "In ultimate analysis, the law requires com-
pulsion-intelligent, reasoned, measured, and tempered, but com-
pulsion nonetheless. . . . If we remove the element of compulsion
from law, what remains may be a perfectly devised system of ethics and
morals, but it will not be a working system of law.' 130  The Fleming
125. Mathew 22:21.
126. For an analytical treatment of the concept of supersedence in an exclusively
secular setting, see Morse, The Doctrine of Supersedence, 1963 LA REvuE LEA U. 385.
127. F. POLLOCK, JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL ESSAYS 18 (1961).
128. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 119.
129. M. FLEMmNG, THE PRICE OF PRFnEcr JUSrTCE-THE ADWVRSE CONSEQUENCES OF
CURRENT LEGAL DocrmNE ON Tm AMmuCAN CoURTRoOM (1974).
130. Id. at V.
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statement is qualified so as to be somewhat ameliorative of Hobbes.
Modifying the Hobbes-Fleming stance is the following posture as-
sumed by Yves R. Simon in his The Tradition of Natural Law-A
Philosopher's Reflections, 3' published in 1965: "When a society is in
such a condition that its laws are obeyed only insofar as there is real
danger of being caught and punished, it has already disintegrated and
even the fear of punishment cannot do much to hold it together."'3 z
Hobbes presaged Simon's "fear of punishment" in the following the-
matic passage:
The final Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally
love Liberty, and Dominion over others,) in the introduction
of that restraint upon themselves, (in which wee see them
live in Common-wealths,) is the foresight of their own preser-
vation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say,
of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of
Warre, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shewn)
to the naturall Passions of men, when there is no visible Power
to keep them in awe, and tye them by feare of punishment
to the performance of their Covenants .... 33
In analyzing Jean-Jacques Rousseau's The Social Contract, Simon
wrote:
The political booklet of Rousseau, with all its subtleties, ex-
presses powerfully the theory that the state is constituted by
a total surrender of one's freedom to a general will with which
ones own will is identified in a quasi-mystical way, so that,
by obeying the will of the people alone one remains as free
as in the state of native independence.' 34
The foregoing statement encompasses two Rousseauian points of contra-
diction of Hobbesian philosophy. Point 1: According to Hobbes, the
state is constituted by not a total, but by a partial, surrender of one's
freedom. However, whereas all freedom is not, most freedom is, sur-
rendered. An example of Point 1, as stated by Hobbes, is: "In cases
where the Soveraign has prescribed no rule, there the Subject hath the
Liberty to do, or forbeare, according to his own discretion."' 35  The
term "liberty" is equated by Professor Hohfeld to the word "free-
dom.' 36 Partially analogous to the last-quoted Hobbesian statement is
131. Y. SIMoN, THE TRADMON OF NATURAL LAw-A PHILOSOPHER'S REFLEmIIONS
(1965).
132. Id. at 118.
133. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 139.
134. SmioN, supra note 131, at 73-74.
135. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 186.
136. Hohfeld, supra note 61, at 42-43.
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the American constitutional law doctrine of concurrent powers if nation-
al government is transposed for sovereign and state for subject. The
doctrine is partially, rather than totally, analogous, however, because
sovereignty resides in the peoples of the several states. Point 2: Ac-
cording to Hobbes, one does not remain as free in the state as in the
state of native independence or, in Hobbesian nomenclature, "the condi-
tion of meer Nature."' 37 An example of Point 2, as stated by Hobbes,
is: "And Law was brought into the world for nothing else, but to limit
the naturall liberty of particular men, in such manner, as they might not
hurt, but assist one another, and joyn together against a common
Enemy."13 8
Hobbes stated:
The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign, is under-
stood to last as long, and no longer, than the power last-
eth, by which he is able to protect them . . . .
But if a man, besides the obligation of a Sub-
ject, hath taken upon him a new obligation of a Souldier,
then he hath not the liberty to submit to a new Power,
as long as the old one keeps the field, and giveth him
means of subsistence, either in his Armies, or Garrisons:
for in this case, he cannot complain of want of protection,
and means to live as a Souldier: But when that also
failes, a Souldier also may seek his Protection where-
soever he has most hope to have it; and may lawfully sub-
mit himself to his new Master. 40
Perhaps the foremost example in history of a soldier such as is envisioned
upon a reading of the foregoing passage is General Field Marshal
Friedrich Paulus. Four times he was denied permission by Hitler to
effect a break-out of the German Sixth Army from the trap at Stalin-
grad. The Hoth Corps Group was unable to traverse the remaining
nineteen miles necessary for Paulus' relief.'41  When Paulus, as a pris-
oner of war whom Russia had no intention of ever repatriating, testified
as a surprise witness for the Soviet Union at the trial before the Interna-
137. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 113.
138. Id. at 228.
139. Id. at 187.
140. Id. at 621-22.
141. For an analytical summation of the Battle of Stalingrad, see Morse, A Reca-
pitulation of the Great Capitulation, 26 CAN. MiL. 1. 9 (1960); for an analysis of the
nexus between law and military science, see Morse, Juristisches und Militarisches Denken
und Handeln, 4 NEuE SEITscHmusT FUR WEHRREr 145, Jahrg. 4, Heft 4, October 1962
(J. Schweitzer Verlag, Berlin).
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tional Military Tribunal at Nuremberg on the afternoon of February 11,
1946, his devastating testimony 142 proved to be the principal cause for
the death sentences meted out to Keitel, Jodl and Goring. When he
accepted the Russian commission to organize and train the East German
army, can the propriety of his actions be questioned without questioning
the verity of the Hobbesian statement?
142. VII SECRETARIAT OF THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIM-
INALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 261 (1947).
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